"hair did" and "bad grammar"

[Cindy]

That is interesting, although the "febyooery" pronunciation is easily explained as an analogical extension of "January," where I'm not aware of any equivalent for "nuclear."

Molecular? Cellular? If you think about it, lots of science-y words end with "ular," and I'd guess that's where it's coming from.

[Katya]

That is interesting, although the "febyooery" pronunciation is easily explained as an analogical extension of "January," where I'm not aware of any equivalent for "nuclear."

Molecular? Cellular? If you think about it, lots of science-y words end with "ular," and I'd guess that's where it's coming from.

Oooh, interesting. That could very well be it.

[Yarjka]

I just want to chime in with an observation, that just like in "White and Nerdy," "It's All About the Pentiums," and various other songs, Weird Al's "Word Crimes" makes fun of the internet culture (people who correct "grammar" mistakes every chance they get, regardless of whether or not they actually inhibit understanding) he is a part of (and yes, he is highlighting the elitism and whiteness of that culture). It's a self-deprecating humor. He is not making fun of people who have "bad grammar" (well, he is, but he isn't).

[Marduk]

This is a bit off topic, and is an ongoing conflict even within my field, but is there anything to be said about how language patterns influence thought? I'm all for stepping away from linguistic prescriptivism because of the social, racial, educational, and economic problems that arise with it (to name a few) but doesn't having some sort of formalized language actually influence our ability to think logically and coherently?

I know there's been some research to suggest that languages in which there are more words for various color gradations, for example, leads to people being able to identify differences in those gradations which others, lacking names for them, would not be able to identify. Similarly, doesn't having organization and strictures of definitions increase our mental propensity to keep concepts distinct in our mind? Given this particular merger, although I'm uncomfortable with the racial implications, doesn't keeping a distinction between the two words actually lead to those ideas being able to be distinct mentally?

If so, is there any way to accomplish that distinction without unfairly penalizing unprivileged racial or economic groups?

[Katya]

I just want to chime in with an observation, that just like in "White and Nerdy," "It's All About the Pentiums," and various other songs, Weird Al's "Word Crimes" makes fun of the internet culture (people who correct "grammar" mistakes every chance they get, regardless of whether or not they actually inhibit understanding) he is a part of (and yes, he is highlighting the elitism and whiteness of that culture). It's a self-deprecating humor. He is not making fun of people who have "bad grammar" (well, he is, but he isn't).

And maybe he's also poking fun at the uproar caused by the original song (as in, the only thing that riles people up on the internet more than misogyny is bad grammar).

[mic0]

Marduk, I just read your post and want to respond to it, but I might write a lot or I might write a little, haven't decided yet. There is certainly a lot to say, but I'll try to be succinct. I'm not doing it today, either - too tired. To clarify though, when you say: "doesn't keeping a distinction between the two words actually lead to those ideas being able to be distinct mentally?" Which two words are you talking about? Color words, or something from the discussion here? Anyway, spoiler for your questions, but I'd overall say "no." I'll get back to this sometime this weekend.

[Katya]

This is a bit off topic, and is an ongoing conflict even within my field, but is there anything to be said about how language patterns influence thought? I'm all for stepping away from linguistic prescriptivism because of the social, racial, educational, and economic problems that arise with it (to name a few) but doesn't having some sort of formalized language actually influence our ability to think logically and coherently?

This is a really interesting question. I have lots of thoughts and I don't know how coherently I'll be able to assemble them, but I'll try.

First the idea that language influences thought is closely tied up with the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, which, in its strong form, has been pretty roundly discredited by actual linguists. In the popular realm, though, it crops up in terms of "speakers of X language have no word for Y [therefore they have no concept for Y]," which is almost always untrue, anyway (usually they have many words for Y or different words for Y than we do). It also sounds laughable when you try to apply it to your native language (or another language you know well): "Speakers of English have no word for ellos or ellas, therefore they have no concept of gender in groups of people." "Speakers of English have no word for tu or vous, therefore they can't comprehend the difference between formal and informal situations." "Speakers of Spanish have no word for "sibling," therefore they can't conceive of a sibling relationship that isn't gender-specific."

However, you're right that language can influence cognition in some measurable ways. E.g., the personification of abstract concepts such as "death" or "time" tends to follow the gender of those words in languages that have grammatical gender. (So, in English we somewhat arbitrarily view death as male, but language where "death" is a feminine word, paintings of death would portray death as female.) Likewise, in languages with grammatical gender, people can recognize nouns more quickly when they're preceded by an adjective of the appropriate gender than people can in languages without gender. So, if a French speaker was shown the word "belle" followed by "table," she'd be able to recognize the word "table" slightly faster than I would if I was shown "beautiful" followed by "table." (BUT the French speaker would be slower if she'd been shown the word "beau" followed by "table," because that's the wrong gender.)

Your second question seems to presuppose that if someone isn't speaking the standard dialect of a language, they aren't speaking a "formalized language" at all. That's not true at all. The rules and structures of language are more or less self-regulating within language groups and as children learn their native language. (In fact, children can even impose rules on codes that don't already have them, as when a pidgin formalizes into a creole.) If you mean that people going back and forth between "done" and "did" implies that their dialect doesn't have structured rules, I'd be more likely to chalk that up to an individual speaker going back and forth between standard and nonstandard dialects, and not to inherent lack of structure in a specific dialect.

I guess your second question could also mean "Without prescriptivists to keep language on the straight and narrow, won't our language fall apart?" If that's what your asking, then I'd say that the issues that prescriptivists get worked up over are only the very surface level of what constitutes the grammar structures of a language. For instance, prescriptivists don't go around telling native English speakers to be sure to maintain SVO word order in simple declarative sentences, even though that's a relatively unusual language feature, worldwide. (VSO is much more common.) Prescriptivists also don't go around telling native English speakers to be sure to maintain the proper adjective order by category, even though that's another feature that varies by language. Those (and most structures) are things that we simply maintain on our own, without external regulation.

I know there's been some research to suggest that languages in which there are more words for various color gradations, for example, leads to people being able to identify differences in those gradations which others, lacking names for them, would not be able to identify.

I don't know if it's fair to say that people who don't have as many basic color terms are unable to identify those colors; perhaps it might be more accurate to say that they don't have as much practice doing so. There have also been studies that showed that women use more specific color terms than men do, but I don't think that anyone would argue that men and women speak different dialects of English. (Interestingly, one of these studies also included a group of women who had been cloistered nuns for decades, and those women used the fewest color terms of all, implying that environmental and cultural factors play a significant role.) Along those same lines, I wouldn't be at all surprised if an artist or a fashion designer used many more color terms than the average person but, again, I wouldn't argue that they're speaking a different dialect.

Similarly, doesn't having organization and strictures of definitions increase our mental propensity to keep concepts distinct in our mind? Given this particular merger, although I'm uncomfortable with the racial implications, doesn't keeping a distinction between the two words actually lead to those ideas being able to be distinct mentally?

It's true that different languages are complex in different ways (Mandarin has tones, Navajo has classifiers, English has a complicated set of vowels, Finnish has a complicated declension system, etc.), and it's true that the speakers of those languages therefore have to devote mental energy to keeping those complexities straight. But not all languages have every complexity. (Mandarin has a very simple consonant structure, English has no grammatical gender, Finnish has a small phonetic inventory, etc.) It's probably not fair to say that every language is equally complex, but I think it is fair to say that most languages have some unusually complex aspects and most have some more simple aspects, so most speakers get some practice at making some tricky cognitive distinctions.

If so, is there any way to accomplish that distinction without unfairly penalizing unprivileged racial or economic groups?

Well, here's the thing. If speaking a syntactically complex language leads to advanced cognitive function, which in turn privileges the speakers of that language . . . then English speakers should be screwed and Navajo speakers should be running the world. English does have a fair amount of phonological complexity, but our grammar is very simple compared to most languages in the world. We don't have classifiers or grammatical gender or animacy (well, not like Russian or Navajo, at least); our conjugation system is very simple, aside from a number of irregular past participles. I honestly don't see a big different between the complexity of Standard American English and that of AAVE or any other similar dialect, even if speakers of the latter don't differentiate between simple past and past participles.

Interesting question, though. Thanks for bringing it up!

[Portia]

John McWhorter's The Language Hoax is an excellent takedown of this idea (i.e., that some thoughts are only thinkable in a certain language/dialect). One of my favorite contemporary linguistics books. He even addresses race/class issues. Check it out.

[mic0]

Katya pretty much covered everything I wanted to! I'll just add that probably the biggest take away I've gotten from my cognitive linguistics classes is that language has some effect on our thinking but this effect can be easily manipulated, neutralized, or reversed.

[mic0]

Oh, also, while the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is interesting, it is pretty much discounted in its strong form (as Katya said). The said, language and cognition are connected in other really interesting ways, such as the way we process action words and metaphors. If you're interested, maybe check out the more pop ling book Louder Than Words and the theory of embodied cognition.

[Whistler]

related: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/d-bri ... -9-CPldUpo